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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 13-3424 
________________ 
 
GARY WILKINSON, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-00439) 
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 3, 2014 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
  
(Filed: March 5, 2014) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION   
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Gary Wilkinson appeals from the District Court’s order affirming a final decision 
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his request for disability insurance 
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benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act 
(the “Act”).  
I. Background 
 In April 2010, Wilkinson filed applications for DIB and SSI.  He alleged that he 
was disabled due to, inter alia, neck, back and knee injuries. In September 2011, the ALJ 
issued a decision determining that Wilkinson was not “disabled” within the meaning of 
the Act.  The Appeals Council denied Wilkinson’s request for review, making the ALJ’s 
decision the final decision of the Commissioner.  The District Court affirmed the 
Commissioner’s decision on the ground that the ALJ’s conclusion was supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. 
 The focus of Wilkinson’s appeal is the ALJ’s finding with respect to his alleged 
postural and manipulative limitations.  In June 2010, the state agency physician, Dr. Abu 
N. Ali, M.D., completed a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment of 
Wilkinson.
1
  In his RFC report, Dr. Ali found that Wilkinson was limited to a sedentary 
RFC, but could make “occasional” postural movements (i.e., climb, balance, stoop, kneel, 
crouch, and crawl).  Dr. Ali found that Wilkinson was limited in reaching in any direction 
with his left upper extremity, but was otherwise free from manipulative limitations.  
Various other medical evidence in the record contradicted Dr. Ali’s conclusions that 
Wilkinson was subject to some postural and manipulative limitations.  For example, 
treatment reports by Dr. Gopinath Rajupet noted that Wilkinson had good strength in the 
                                              
1
 An individual’s residual functional capacity is the most he can do despite limitations 
from his impairments.  20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.  
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legs and arms, deep tendon reflexes that were bilaterally symmetrical and equal, intact 
hand grip, and no objective sensory or motor loss.  Additionally, Wilkinson himself 
acknowledged that he could prepare simple meals, complete light household chores, drive 
for short distances, and play computer and video games.    
 After considering all the evidence, the ALJ found that Wilkinson had the RFC to 
perform sedentary work that allowed him “to lift up to 10 pounds occasionally and less 
than 10 pounds frequently” as well as to “sit and stand alternatively at will.”  A.R. 13.  
The ALJ noted that, in making this finding, she had “considered all symptoms and the 
extent to which these symptoms [could] reasonably be accepted as consistent with the 
objective medical evidence and other evidence” in addition to “opinion evidence.”  Id.  
The ALJ further stated that she had “evaluated and considered the opinions of State 
agency medical consultant, Dr. Ali, M.D., . . . and given them significant weight in 
conjunction with other relevant evidence in rendering this decision.”  Id.  The ALJ agreed 
with Dr. Ali’s conclusion that Wilkinson was “capable of sedentary exertion.” A.R. 15.  
The ALJ’s RFC, however, did not acknowledge that Wilkinson was subject to any 
postural or manipulative limitations.   
 Wilkinson argues on appeal that his case requires a remand because the ALJ 
accorded Dr. Ali’s opinion “significant weight” yet did not adopt the portion of Dr. Ali’s 
opinion finding that Wilkinson had occasional postural and manipulative limitations.   
II. Discussion 
 We uphold the ALJ’s findings so long as they are supported by substantial 
evidence.  Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005).  Substantial 
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evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”  Id. (quoting Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 
2003)).  It is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance 
of the evidence.”  Id. (quoting Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146, 1148 (3d Cir. 
1971)).  
 To determine whether a claimant is disabled under the Act, an ALJ completes a 
five-step evaluation, considering in sequence whether the claimant: (1) is working at a 
substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment that meets 
or equals the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) can perform his previous work; and 
if not, (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing other work.  See 20 C.F.R. 
§§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003).  This 
case deals with step five of the evaluation process, which requires the ALJ to determine 
whether the claimant can perform other work in the national economy.  The ALJ satisfies 
her burden of production at this step when she identifies at least one occupation with a 
significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.  20 
C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(b), 416.966(b).  She found that Wilkinson had the RFC to perform 
sedentary work, but did not expressly identify that he was subject to any postural or 
manipulative limitations.  Relying on this RFC, a vocational expert (“VE”) testified that 
Wilkinson would be able to perform as an order clerk, surveillance system monitor, or 
ticket checker, and the ALJ ultimately concluded that because Wilkinson was “capable of 
making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the 
national economy,” he was not disabled.  A.R. 17-18.  
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 Wilkinson argues that the ALJ presented the VE with a defective hypothetical 
RFC that was devoid of postural or manipulative limitations and that, as a result, he was 
wrongly classified as not disabled.  Specifically, Wilkinson contends that because the 
ALJ gave Dr. Ali’s opinion “significant” weight, she could not decline to adopt any of 
Dr. Ali’s particular findings without an explanation.  As an initial matter, no rule or 
regulation compels an ALJ to incorporate into an RFC every finding made by a medical 
source simply because the ALJ gives the source’s opinion as a whole “significant” 
weight.  On the contrary, the controlling regulations are clear that the RFC finding is a 
determination expressly reserved to the Commissioner.  See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 
416.927(d)(2), 404.1546(c), 416.946(c).  Additionally, as the District Court persuasively 
explained, the ALJ relied on multiple sources in reaching her conclusion, and specifically 
noted that she gave Dr. Ali’s opinions “significant weight in conjunction with other 
relevant evidence.”  A.R. 15 (emphasis added).  To support her RFC, the ALJ cited to 
other record evidence that was inconsistent with Dr. Ali’s finding of postural limitations, 
including medical reports that Wilkinson was doing well, had good leg and arm strength, 
and Wilkinson’s own record of his daily activities.  Id. at 14-16.  The ALJ was not 
required to adopt all of Dr. Ali’s opinion solely because she found the opinion as a whole 
persuasive and, as the District Court correctly noted, it is not our role to “re-weigh the 
evidence of record and substitute [our] judgment as to whether [Wilkinson] is disabled 
under the Act for that of the ALJ.”  Op. at 7-8; see also Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 
806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986).  
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 Wilkinson next contends that the ALJ’s failure to acknowledge his alleged 
postural and manipulative limitations is particularly important in light of Social Security 
Ruling 96-9p (“SSR 96-9p”), which explains that postural and manipulative limitations 
may erode the sedentary occupational base.  See SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185 (July 2, 
1996).  Nothing in SSR 96-9p, however, is contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion that 
Wilkinson is capable of performing sedentary work.  For example, while that Ruling 
states that “[a] complete inability to stoop would significantly erode the unskilled 
sedentary occupational base,” it goes on to note that “restriction to occasional stooping 
should, by itself, only minimally erode the unskilled occupational base of sedentary 
work.”  Id.  Here Dr. Ali found that Wilkinson could occasionally stoop, and so any 
erosion of his occupational base is minimal.   
 Wilkinson’s argument that SSR 96-9p states that reaching limitations can erode 
the sedentary occupational base is similarly unsupported by the text of the ruling.  SSR 
96-9p makes no mention of the effect of reaching limitations on the occupational base; 
what the ruling says is that “[a]ny significant manipulative limitation of an individual’s 
ability to handle and work with small objects with both hands will result in a significant 
erosion of the unskilled sedentary occupational base.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  While 
Dr. Ali found that Wilkinson had limited reaching ability with his left upper extremity, he 
identified no limitations as to Wilkinson’s ability to reach with his right upper extremity, 
or his ability to handle, finger or feel objects with either upper extremity, and so SSR 96-
9p does not apply.   
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 Finally, we have examined the numerous cases Wilkinson cites in support of his 
position and conclude that they are not on point.  In this context, we affirm.  
 
 
 
